Capacity of Quantum Private Information Retrieval with Multiple Servers by Song, Seunghoan & Hayashi, Masahito
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
10
20
9v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
11
 Ju
l 2
01
9
1
Capacity of Quantum Private Information Retrieval
with Multiple Servers
Seunghoan Song and Masahito Hayashi, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—We study the capacity of quantum private infor-
mation retrieval (QPIR) with multiple servers. In the QPIR
problem with multiple servers, a user retrieves a classical file
by downloading quantum systems from multiple servers each of
which containing the whole classical file set, without revealing the
identity of the retrieved file to any individual server. The QPIR
capacity is defined as the maximum rate of the file size over the
whole dimension of the downloaded quantum systems. When the
preexisting entanglement among servers are assumed, we prove
that the QPIR capacity with multiple servers is 1 regardless of the
number of servers and files. We propose a rate-one protocol which
can be implemented by using only two servers. This capacity-
achieving protocol outperforms its classical counterpart in the
sense of the capacity, server secrecy, and upload cost. The strong
converse bound is derived concisely without using any secrecy
condition. We also prove that the capacity of multi-round QPIR
with server secrecy is 1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Introduced in the seminal paper by Chor et al. [1], private
information retrieval (PIR) finds efficient methods to download
a file from non-communicating servers each of which contain-
ing the whole classical file set, without revealing the identity
of the downloaded file to each server. This problem is trivially
solved by requesting all files to the servers, but this method
is inefficient. Finding an efficient method is the goal of this
problem and it has been extensively studied in many papers
[2]–[5]. Moreover, the papers [6]–[10] studied quantum PIR
(QPIR) problem where the user downloads quantum systems,
instead of classical bits, in order to retrieve a classical file
from the servers.
In classical PIR studies, the paper [11] started the discussion
of capacities for PIR problems with multiple servers. The
PIR capacity is defined by the maximum rate of the file
size over the download size. The upload cost, i.e., the total
size of the queries, is neglected since it does not scale with
the file size, which is allowed to go infinity. For the PIR
with n non-communicating servers each containing the whole
set of f files, the paper [11] showed that the capacity is
(1 − 1/n)/(1 − (1/n)f). Moreover, the paper [12] proposed
a capacity-achieving protocol whose upload cost and file size
are minimum in a general class of PIR protocols. Furthermore,
after [11], several PIR capacities have been studied under
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TABLE I
CAPACITIES OF CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM PIRS
Classical PIR Capacity Quantum PIR Capacity
PIR
1− n−1
1 − n−f
[11] 1 ‡
Symmetric PIR 1− n−1 [13] † 1 ‡
Multi-round PIR
1− n−1
1 − n−f
[19] 1
∗ n, f: the numbers of servers and files, respectively.
† Shared randomness among servers is necessary.
‡ Capacities are derived by strong converse.
different problem settings. Symmetric PIR is the PIR with
server secrecy that the user obtains no more information than
the target file, and the capacity of symmetric PIR is 1 − n−1
[13]. Another extension is the PIR with coded databases
[16]–[18], where the set of files is coded and distributed to
the servers, whereas the PIR in [11] assumes that the file
set is replicated to all servers. The capacity of PIR with
files coded by (n, k) maximum distance separable code is
(1 − k/n)/(1 − (k/n)f) [16]. Multi-round PIR has also been
studied in [19] and the capacity was proved to be the same as
the PIR capacity derived in [11].
On the other hand, the QPIR problem is rarely treated with
multiple servers and there is no study on the capacity of
the QPIR problem. Though the paper [7] treated the QPIR
problem with multiple servers, the paper [7] evaluated the
communication complexity which is the sum of upload and
download costs required to retrieve one bit file, instead of the
capacity.
In the paper, as quantum extensions of the classical PIR
capacities [11], [13], [16], [19], we show that the capacities
of QPIR, symmetric QPIR, and multi-round QPIR are 1 even
when there are multiple servers. First, we derive the QPIR
capacity when a user retrieves a file secretly from n non-
communicating servers containing the whole set of f files
by downloading quantum states under the assumption that an
entangled state is shared previously among all servers. We
define the security of the QPIR protocol with three parameters:
the retrieval error probability, the user secrecy that the identity
of the querying file is unknown to any individual server, and
the server secrecy that the user obtains no more information
than the target file. As a main result, we show that the QPIR
capacity is 1 regardless of whether it is of exact/asymptotic
security and with/without the restriction that the upload cost is
negligible to the download cost. We propose a rate-one QPIR
protocol with perfect security and finite upload cost. Even for
2TABLE II
COMPARISON OF PROTOCOLS IN THIS PAPER AND [12]
This paper Paper [12]
Server secrecy Yes No
Capacity 1 (1−n−1)/(1−n−f )
Condition for
capacity 1
n ≥ 2 n→∞
Upload cost 2f bits n(f − 1) log n bits
File size 2 log ℓ bits (n − 1) log ℓ bits
∗ n, f: the numbers of servers and files, respectively.
† ℓ: any integer greater than 1.
any QPIR protocol with no secrecy, no upload constraint, and
any error probability less than 1, we propose the converse
bound is 1. Moreover, we show that the capacity of symmetric
multi-round QPIR is 1 by proving a weak converse bound such
that the multi-round QPIR rate is upper bounded by 1 when
the error probability is asymptotically zero.
Our capacity-achieving protocol has several remarkable
advantages compared to the protocol in [12] whose upload
cost and file size are minimized (see Table I). First, without
shared randomness among servers, our protocol is a symmetric
QPIR protocol which guarantees the server secrecy, in the
sense that the user obtains no information from files other
than the retrieved one. This contrasts with the protocol in
[12] that retrieves some information of other files. Secondly,
our protocol keeps the secrecy against the malicious user and
servers. Thirdly, the rate 1 of our protocol is greater than the
rate (1−n−1)/(1−n−f) of the protocol in [12]. Fourthly, there
is no benefit to using more servers or files in our protocol since
our protocol achieves the capacity 1 using only two servers.
On the other hand, in the protocol in [12], the capacity is
strictly increasing in the numbers of servers and files and an
infinite number of servers are needed to achieve the capacity
1. Fifthly, the upload in this protocol is 2f bits whereas the
protocol in [12] needs (n(f − 1) log n)-bit upload. Lastly, our
protocol is implemented if the file size m is the square of any
integer, but the protocol in [12] requires the file size m to be
the (n− 1)-th power of any integer.
The converse proofs of the QPIR capacities are much
simpler than those of the PIR capacities [11], [13], [16], [19].
Whereas the papers [11], [13], [16], [19] used several entropy
inequalities based on the assumptions on the PIR problem,
our converse bounds are concisely derived without using any
secrecy conditions but by focusing on the downloading step
of QPIR protocol.
It should be noted that our QPIR protocol can be consid-
ered as a distributed version of oblivious transfer (OT) [20],
[21]. OT is defined as the symmetric PIR with one server
and therefore, symmetric PIR with multiple servers can be
considered as a distributed version of OT. OT is an important
cryptographic protocol because the free uses of OT protocol
constructs an arbitrary secure multiparty computation [22],
[23]. Unfortunately, the symmetric classical PIR cannot be
constructed without secret shared randomness among servers
[24]. On the other hand, the paper [7] showed that the two-
way quantum communication between the servers and the user
enables the symmetric PIR without secret shared randomness.
Our result extends the result [7] so that even for the case of
classical upload, quantum download, and previously shared
entanglement among the servers, the symmetric PIR can be
constructed without secret shared randomness. Note that if
quantum upload is allowed to our model, the assumption of
shared entanglement is not necessary because the user can
upload an entangled state to all servers.
The assumption of shared randomness is quite restrictive
assumption because a preparation protocol is necessary for
the servers to initialize a certain entangled state. However, the
assumption of preexisting entanglement has also been given
in the quantum interactive proof (QIP) [25]–[27]. The papers
[25]–[27] treated the QIP problem that a computationally
limited verifier requests some computation task to multiple
provers with quantum computers and verifies the correctness
of the computation result. Similarly to our QPIR protocol, the
QIP protocols in [25]–[27] assumed that the multiple provers
share an entanglement but do not communicate. On the other
hand, whereas the paper [25], [27] (the paper [26]) assumed
the two-way quantum (classical) communication between the
verifier and each prover, our paper assumes the classical
communication for upload but the quantum communication
for download.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the formal definition of the QPIR protocol and
capacity, and proposes the QPIR capacity theorem. Section III
constructs the rate-one QPIR protocol and analyzes the secu-
rity of our protocol against the malicious user and servers.
Section IV proves the converse bound. Section V extends the
result to the capacity of multi-round QPIR protocol. Section VI
is the conclusion of this paper.
Notations: For any set T , denote by |T | the cardinality
of the set T and by IT (or I) the identity operator on T .
For any matrix B, denote by B¯ the complex conjugate of B
and B† := B¯⊤. The ring of integers is denoted by Z, and
Zd := Z/dZ for any integer d. PrX [A] denotes the probability
that the variable X satisfies the condition A. For any quantum
system A, we denote the set of quantum states on A by S(A).
II. QPIR PROTOCOL AND MAIN THEOREM
In this section, we formally define the QPIR protocol and
its capacity, and presents a main theorem of the paper. For
preliminaries on quantum information theory, see Appendix A.
A. Formal definition of QPIR protocol
The QPIR with multiple servers (hereinafter QPIR) is de-
scribed as follows. Consider a user and non-communicating
n servers serv1, . . . , servn each of which containing the
whole set of uniformly and independently distributed f files
W1, . . . ,Wf ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} for integers n, f,m ≥ 2. Each
server servt possesses a quantum system A˜t and the n servers
share an entangled state ρprev ∈ S(
⊗n
i=1 A˜i) in the beginning.
The user chooses the query index K in order to retrieve the
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Query Index: K ∈ {1, . . . , f}
serv1
W1
W2
...
Wf
serv2
W1
W2
...
Wf
· · ·
servn
W1
W2
...
Wf
Shared Entanglement ρprev
WK ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Q1
Q2 Qn
A1 A2 An
ρW,Q
A˜1 A˜2 A˜n
Fig. 1. Quantum private information retrieval protocol with multiple servers.
The composite system of the servers is initialized to an entangled state ρperv.
K-th file WK , where the distribution of K is uniform and
independent of the file Wi for any i ∈ {1, . . . , f}.
In order to retrieve the K-th file WK , the user chooses a
random variable Ruser in a set Ruser and encodes the queries
for retrieving WK by user encoder Encuser:
Encuser(K,Ruser) = (Q1, . . . , Qn) ∈ Q1 × · · · × Qn,
where Qt is the set of query symbols to the t-th server for
any t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The n queries Q1, . . . , Qn are sent to
the servers serv1, . . . , servn, respectively. After receiving the
t-th query Qt, each server servt applies a trace-preserving
completely positive (TP-CP) linear map Λt from A˜t to At
depending on Qt,W1, . . . ,Wf and sends the quantum system
At to the user. With server encoder Encservt , the map Λt is
written as
Λt = Encservt(Qt,W1, . . . ,Wf),
and the received state of the user is written as
ρW,Q := Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn(ρprev) ∈ S
(
n⊗
i=1
Ai
)
, (1)
where W := (W1, . . . ,Wf) and Q := (Q1, . . . , Qn). Next,
the user retrieves the file WK by a decoder which is defined
depending on K,Q as a Positive Operator-Valued Measure
(POVM) Dec(K,Q) := {YM}mM=0. The protocol outputs the
measurement outcome M ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and if M = m, it is
considered as retrieval failure.
1) Protocol: When the numbers n and f of servers and
files are fixed, a QPIR protocol of file size m is formulated
by the 4-tuple Ψ(m)QPIR := (ρprev,Encuser,Encserv,Dec) of the
previously shared entangled state ρprev among servers, the
user encoder Encuser, the collection of the server encoders
Encserv := (Encserv1 , . . . ,Encservn), and the decoder Dec.
2) Security: A QPIR protocol has two kinds of security
parameters, the error probability and secrecy parameters. The
error probability of the protocol Ψ(m)QPIR is written as
Perr(Ψ
(m)
QPIR) := Pr
W,K,Q
[M 6= WK ].
The secrecy parameters are defined as follows. For any
t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let user(Ψ(m)QPIR) and servt(Ψ(m)QPIR) be the
information of the user and the server servt at the end of the
protocol, respectively. We define the server secrecy parameter
and the user secrecy parameter by
Sserv(Ψ
(m)
QPIR) := I(WKc ; user(Ψ
(m)
QPIR)|K), (2)
Suser(Ψ
(m)
QPIR) := max
t∈{1,...,n}
I(K; servt(Ψ
(m)
QPIR)), (3)
where I(·; ·|·) denotes the conditional mutual informa-
tion and WKc := (W1, . . . ,WK−1,WK+1, . . . ,Wf). If
Sserv(Ψ
(m)
QPIR) = 0, the files other than WK are independent
of the user information. Similarly, if Suser(Ψ
(m)
QPIR) = 0,
the query index K is independent of any individual server
information.
3) Costs, rate, and capacity: Given the QPIR protocol
Ψ
(m)
QPIR, the upload cost, download cost, and rate are defined
by
U(Ψ
(m)
QPIR) :=
n∏
i=1
|Qi|, (4)
D(Ψ
(m)
QPIR) :=
n∏
i=1
dimAi, (5)
R(Ψ
(m)
QPIR) :=
logm
logD(Ψ
(m)
QPIR)
. (6)
The QPIR capacity is defined with constraints on the
security parameters and upload cost. The asymptotic
security-constrained capacity and the exact security-
constrained capacity are defined with error constraint
α ∈ [0, 1), server secrecy constraint β ∈ [0,∞], user secrecy
constraint γ ∈ [0,∞], and upload constraint θ ∈ [0,∞] by
Cα,β,γ,θasymp := sup
{mℓ}
∞
ℓ=1,
{Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR}
∞
ℓ=1
{
lim inf
ℓ→∞
R(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
ℓ→∞
Perr(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR) ≤ α, lim sup
ℓ→∞
Sserv(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR) ≤ β,
lim sup
ℓ→∞
Suser(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR) ≤ γ, lim sup
ℓ→∞
logU(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
logD(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
≤ θ
}
,
Cα,β,γ,θexact := sup
{mℓ}
∞
ℓ=1,
{Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR}
∞
ℓ=1
{
lim inf
ℓ→∞
R(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
∣∣∣∣ Perr(Ψ(mℓ)QPIR) ≤ α, Sserv(Ψ(mℓ)QPIR) ≤ β,
4Suser(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR) ≤ γ, lim sup
ℓ→∞
logU(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
logD(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
≤ θ
}
,
where the supremum is taken for sequences {mℓ}∞ℓ=1 such
that limℓ→∞mℓ = ∞ and sequences {Ψ(mℓ)QPIR}∞ℓ=1 of QPIR
protocols. It is trivial from the definition that for any α ∈
[0, 1), θ ∈ [0,∞], β ∈ [0,∞], and γ ∈ [0,∞],
C0,0,0,0exact ≤ Cα,β,γ,θexact ≤ Cα,β,γ,θasymp ≤ Cα,∞,∞,∞asymp . (7)
B. Main Result
The main theorem of this paper is given as follows.
Theorem II.1. For any α ∈ [0, 1) and β, γ, θ ∈ [0,∞], the
capacity of the quantum private information retrieval with f
files and n ≥ 2 servers sharing preexisting entanglement is
Cα,β,γ,θexact = C
α,β,γ,θ
asymp = 1.
Proof. In Sections III and IV, we will prove C0,0,0,0exact ≥ 1 and
Cα,∞,∞,∞asymp ≤ 1 for any α ∈ [0, 1), respectively. Then, the
inequality (7) implies the theorem.
Note that the capacity does not depend on the number of
files f and the number of servers n. This contrasts to the
classical PIR capacity [11] which is strictly increasing for f
and n. Moreover, the capacity does not depend on the security
constraints, i.e., there is no trade-off between the capacity and
the security constraints. Furthermore, the theorem implies that
the symmetric QPIR capacity is 1.
III. CONSTRUCTION OF PROTOCOL
In this section, we construct a rate-one two-server QPIR
protocol with exact security and negligible upload cost when
the file size m is the square of an arbitrary integer ℓ, i.e.,
m = ℓ2. Then, by taking mℓ = ℓ2, the sequence {Ψ(mℓ)QPIR}∞ℓ=1
of our protocols achieves the rate 1 with exact security and
negligible upload cost, which implies
C0,0,0,0exact ≥ 1. (8)
In the following, after preliminaries on quantum operations
and states in Section III-A, we present the QPIR protocol in
Section III-B.
A. Preliminaries
For an arbitrary integer ℓ ≥ 2, let A be an ℓ-dimensional
Hilbert space spanned by an orthonormal basis {|0〉, . . . , |ℓ−
1〉}. Define a maximally entangled state |Φ〉 on A⊗A by
|Φ〉 := (1/
√
ℓ)
ℓ−1∑
i=0
|i〉 ⊗ |i〉.
For any a, b ∈ Zℓ, generalized Pauli operators on A are
defined as
X :=
ℓ−1∑
i=0
|i+ 1〉〈i|, Z :=
ℓ−1∑
i=0
ωi|i〉〈i|,
where ω = exp(2π
√−1/ℓ), and discrete Weyl operator is
defined as
W(a, b) := XaZb.
These operators satisfy the relations
Z
b
X
a = ωbaXaZb,
W(a1, b1)W(a2, b2) = ω
b1a2W(a1 + a2, b1 + b2),
W(a, b)† = ωbaW(−a,−b).
For any matrix T :=
∑ℓ−1
i,j=0 tij |i〉〈j| on A, we define the
state |T〉 in A⊗A by
|T〉 :=
ℓ−1∑
i,j=0
tij |i〉 ⊗ |j〉.
With this notation, the maximally entangled state is written
as |Φ〉 = (1/√ℓ)|I〉. Since T⊤ = ∑ℓ−1i,j=0 tij |j〉〈i|, it holds
|T〉 = (T ⊗ I)|I〉 = (I ⊗ T⊤)|I〉. Moreover, for any unitaries
U,V on A,
(U⊗ V)|T〉 = |UTV⊤〉,
(U⊗ U)|I〉 = |UU†〉 = |I〉. (9)
With the basis given in the following proposition, we
construct the measurement in our QPIR protocol.
Proposition III.1. The set
{(W(a, b)⊗ I)|Φ〉 | a, b ∈ Zℓ}
is an orthonormal basis of A⊗A.
Proof. Since W(a, b)⊗ I is a unitary matrix for any a, b ∈ Zℓ,
all elements in B are unit vectors. Then, it is sufficient to show
that every different two vectors in B are mutually orthogonal:
for any different (a, b), (c, d) ∈ Z2ℓ ,
((W(a, b) ⊗ I)|Φ〉)†(W(c, d) ⊗ I)|Φ〉 = 0. (10)
Since W(a, b)†W(c, d) = ωb(a−c)W(c−a, d−b), the left-hand
side of (10) is written as
ωb(c−a)〈Φ|(W(c − a, d− b)⊗ I)|Φ〉.
Moreover, it can be confirmed by simple calculation that
〈Φ|(W(a, b) ⊗ I)|Φ〉 = δ(a,b),(0,0) ∀a, b ∈ Zℓ.
Therefore, (10) holds which implies the proposition.
B. Rate-one QPIR protocol
In this section, we propose a rate-one two-server QPIR
protocol with exact security and negligible upload cost. This
protocol is constructed from the idea of the classical two-
server PIR protocol in [1, Section 3.1].
In this protocol, a user retrieves a file WK from two servers
serv1 and serv2 each containing the whole set of files
W1, . . . ,Wf ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ2 − 1 =: mℓ − 1} for an arbitrary
5integer ℓ. By identifying the set {0, . . . , ℓ2 − 1} with the
module Z2ℓ , the filesW1, . . . ,Wf are considered to be elements
of Z2ℓ . We assume that serv1 and serv2 possess the ℓ-
dimensional quantum systems A1 and A2, respectively, and
the maximally entangled state |Φ〉 in A1⊗A2 is shared in the
beginning of the protocol.
1) Protocol: The QPIR protocol for querying the K-th file
WK is described as follows.
Step 0. The maximally entangled state |Φ〉 in A1⊗A2 is
shared between two servers, i.e., ρprev := |Φ〉〈Φ|.
Step 1. Depending on the query index K , the user chooses a
subset Ruser of {1, . . . , f} uniformly. Let Q1 := Ruser
and
Q2 :=
{
Q1 \ {K} if K ∈ Q1,
Q1 ∪ {K} otherwise.
Step 2. The user queries Q1 and Q2 to serv1 and serv2,
respectively.
Step 3. serv1 calculates H1 :=
∑
i∈Q1
Wi ∈ Z2ℓ and applies
W(H1) on the quantum system A1. Similarly, serv2
calculates H2 :=
∑
i∈Q2
Wi and applies W(H2) to
the quantum system A2. That is,
Encserv1(Q1,W1, . . . ,Wf) = W(H1),
Encserv2(Q2,W1, . . . ,Wf) = W(H2),
ρW,Q=(W(H1)⊗W(H2))|Φ〉〈Φ|(W(H1)⊗W(H2))†.
Step 4. serv1 and serv2 send the quantum systems A1 and
A2 to the user, respectively.
Step 5. The user performs a POVM
Dec(K,Q) = {Y(a,b) | a, b ∈ Zℓ}
to the received state ρW,Q, where each POVM element
Y(a,b) for the outcome (a, b) is defined by
Y(a,b) := (W(a, b)⊗ I)|Φ〉〈Φ|(W(a, b)† ⊗ I)
if K ∈ Q1, and
Y(a,b) := (W(−a,−b)⊗ I)|Φ〉〈Φ|(W(−a,−b)† ⊗ I)
otherwise.
2) Security: This protocol has no error as follows. Note that
H1 = H2 +WK if K ∈ Q1, and H1 = H2 −WK otherwise.
After Step 3, the state on A1⊗A2 is
W(H1)⊗W(H2)|Φ〉
=
ω∓bWKaH2√
ℓ
(W(±WK)⊗ I)(W(H2)⊗W(H2))|I〉 (11)
=
ω∓bWKaH2√
ℓ
(W(±WK)⊗ I)|I〉 (12)
= ω∓bWKaH2 (W(±WK)⊗ I)|Φ〉,
where H2 = (aH2 , bH2) and WK = (aWK , bWK ) ∈ Z2ℓ . The
equality (11) is derived from W(H1) = W(±WK + H2) =
ω∓bWK aH2W(±WK)W(H2) and the equality (12) is from (9).
Therefore, in Step 5, the measurement outcome is WK ∈ Z2ℓ
with probability 1.
The exact user secrecy follows from that of the protocol [1,
Section 3.1]. Note that the state of each server is the com-
pletely mixed state, which implies that the only information
obtained by each server is Q1 or Q2. Since each of Q1 and
Q2 is independent of the index K , the exact user secrecy is
obtained.
The exact server secrecy is obtained because the received
state (W(±WK)⊗ I)|Φ〉 of the user is independent of the files
W1, . . . ,WK−1,WK+1, . . . ,Wf .
3) Upload cost, download cost, and rate: The upload cost
is U(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR) = 2
2f because two subsets Q1 and Q2 of
{1, . . . , f} are uploaded and each subset of {1, . . . , f} is
expressed by f bits. The download cost is D(Ψ(mℓ)QPIR) =
dimA1⊗A2 = ℓ2 = mℓ. Therefore, the rate is
R(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR) =
logmℓ
logD(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
= 1,
and (logU(Ψ(mℓ)QPIR))/ logD(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR) goes to zero as mℓ →
∞.
C. Security of our protocol against malicious operations
To discuss the security of the protocol in Section III-B
against the malicious adversary, we need to consider malicious
operations of the user or the servers.
First, consider the case that the servers apply malicious
operations to obtain the query index K . However, since each
of Q1 and Q2 is already independent of the query index K ,
the servers cannot obtain any information of K by malicious
operations.
Next, consider the case that the user sends malicious queries
to the servers in order to obtain the additional file information
other than WK . That is, the user sends malicious queries Q =
(Q1, Q2) in order to retrieve the fileWK and some information
of WKc = (W1, . . . ,WK−1,WK+1, . . . ,Wf). The security of
our protocol against the malicious user operations is proved
by the following relation:
I(A;WKc |WK ,K,Q)ρW,Q = 0, (13)
where A = A1⊗A2 and I(·; ·|·)ρ is the quantum conditional
mutual information defined in Appendix B.
Proof of (13). Since the protocol should retrieve the file WK ,
we have
H(WK | A,K,Q)ρW,Q = 0, (14)
where H(·|·)ρ is the quantum conditional entropy defined in
Appendix B. Eq. (14) is equivalent to
H(A,WK |K,Q)ρW,Q = H(A |K,Q)ρW,Q . (15)
The relation (15) implies the following relations:
0 ≤ H(A |WK ,K,Q)ρW,Q (16)
= H(A,WK |K,Q)ρW,Q −H(WK |K,Q) (17)
= H(A |K,Q)ρW,Q − logmℓ ≤ 0. (18)
The equality in (18) follows from (15), the independence
betweenWK and (K,Q), and the uniform distribution ofWK .
6The last inequality in (18) follows from dimA = logmℓ.
Therefore, we have
H(A |WK ,K,Q)ρW,Q = 0, (19)
and this implies (13).
IV. CONVERSE
In this section, we prove the converse bound
Cα,∞,∞,∞asymp ≤ 1 (20)
for any α ∈ [0, 1). By replacing the notation of ρW,Q
defined in (1), let ρw,z be the quantum state on the composite
system
⊗n
i=1Ai where w is the file to be retrieved and
z := (wc, q) for the collection wc of other m − 1 files and
the collection q of queries. Applying [28, (4.66)] to the choice
σz = (1/m)
∑m−1
w=0 ρw,z for any z, we have
(1− Perr(Ψ(m)QPIR))1+sms ≤ EZ
1
m
m−1∑
w=0
Tr ρ1+sw,Zσ
−s
Z
≤ EZ 1
m
m−1∑
w=0
Tr ρw,Zσ
−s
Z = EZ Tr σ
1−s
Z ≤ maxσ Trσ
1−s
= max
p
d∑
i=1
p1−si
(a)
=
(
n∏
i=1
dimAi
)s
for s ∈ (0, 1) and d = ∏ni=1 dimAi. Here, since x 7→ x1−s
is concave, the maximum maxp
∑d
i=1 p
1−s
i is realized by
the uniform distribution, which shows the equation (a). For
any sequence of QPIR protocols {Ψ(mℓ)QPIR}∞ℓ=1, if Ψ(mℓ)QPIR
has the QPIR rate greater than 1 for any sufficiently large
ℓ, D(Ψ(mℓ)QPIR)/mℓ = (
∏n
i=1 dimAi)/mℓ goes to 0. Hence,
1− Perr(Ψ(mℓ)QPIR) approaches zero, which implies (20).
V. CAPACITY OF MULTI-ROUND QPIR
In this section, we prove that the multi-round PIR capacity is
1. First, as a generalization of the protocol definition in Section
II-A, we formally define the multi-round QPIR. Then, we
propose the capacity theorem and proof of the weak converse
bound.
A. Formal Definition of Multi-Round QPIR Protocol
For any positie integer r, the r-round QPIR protocol Ψ(m,r)QPIR
is described as follows.
Let n, f,m be integers greater than 1. Before the protocol
starts, we prepare the following settings. First, the uniformly
and independently distributed f files W = (W1, . . . ,Wf) ∈
{0, . . . ,m}f are distributed to the servers serv1, . . . , servn.
Next, we prepare the initial entangled state ρprev on A˜(1) ⊗
A˜(2)⊗· · · A˜(r)⊗B(0)1 ⊗B(0)2 ⊗· · ·⊗B(0)n , where A˜
(i)
:= A˜(i)1 ⊗
A˜(i)2 ⊗· · ·⊗A˜
(i)
n for any i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. The quantum systems
are distributed to the n servers such that the t-th server servt
possesses A(1)t ⊗A(2)t ⊗ · · · ⊗ A(r)t ⊗B(0)t . The user chooses
the query index K ∈ {1, . . . , f} uniformly and independently
of the filesW1, . . . ,Wf , and prepares the quantum system C(0)
with the state τ (0) depending on K .
For i ∈ {1, . . . , r}, the i-th round is described as follows.
The user prepares the queries by applying a quantum instru-
ment {Enc(i),K,M(1),...,M(i−1)
user,Q(i)
}Q(i)∈Q(i) from C(i−1) to C˜(i),
which is defined depending on K,M (1), . . . ,M (i−1), as
c · Enc(i),K,M(1),...,M(i−1)
user,Q(i)
(τ (i−1)) = τ˜ (i) ∈ S(C˜(i)),
where c is the normalizing multiplicand,M (j) is the decoding
outcome of the j-th round and the measurement outcome is
denoted by
Q(i) ∋ Q(i) = (Q(i)1 , . . . , Q(i)n ) ∈ Q(i)1 × · · · × Q(i)n .
Here, Q(i)t is the set of query symbols to the t-th server. The
user sends Q
(i)
t to the t-th server servt.
Each server servt applies a quantum operation
Enc
(i),W,Q
(1)
t ,...,Q
(i)
t
servt
from A˜(i)t ⊗ B(i−1)t to A(i)t ⊗B(i)t
depending on W,Q(1)t , . . . , Q
(i)
t . That is, when the collection
of server encoders are written as
Enc
(i),W,Q(1),...,Q(i)
serv
:=
n⊗
t=1
Enc
(i),W,Q
(1)
t ,...,Q
(i)
t
servt
,
the state σ(i)
A˜
(i)
B(i−1)
on A˜(i) ⊗ B(i−1) is encoded as
ρ
(i)
A(i) B(i)
:= Enc(i),W,Q
(1),...,Q(i)
serv
(σ
(i)
A˜
(i)
B(i−1)
),
where A(i) := A(i)1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ A(i)n and B(i) := B(i)1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
B(i)n . Each server transmits the system A(i)t to the user and
the received state of the user is written as
ρ
(i)
A(i)
:= TrB(i) ρ
(i)
A(i) B(i)
. (21)
Next, the user applies a quantum instrument
{Dec(i),K,Q(1),...,Q(i),M(1),...,M(i−1)
M(i)
}m(i)
M(i)=1
from A(i)⊗C˜(i) to
C(i), where m(i) is a positive integer for any i ∈ {1, . . . , r−1}
and m(r) := m. The measurement outcome is denoted by
M (i) ∈ {0, . . . ,m(i)}. When i = r, the protocol outputs M (r)
and if the output is M (r) = m, it is considered as retrieval
failure.
When r = 1, the above protocol is equivalent to the protocol
defined in Section II-A.
1) Security: Similarly to Section II-A, three security pa-
rameters are defined as
Perr(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR) := Pr
W,K
[M (r) 6= WK ],
Sserv(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR) := I(WKc ; user(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR)|K),
Suser(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR) := max
t∈{1,...,n}
I(K; servt(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR)),
where Q = (Q(1), . . . , Q(r)).
72) Costs, rate, and capacity: Given the QPIR protocol
Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR, the upload cost, download cost, and rate are defined
by
U(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR) :=
r∏
i=1
|Q(i)|, (22)
D(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR) :=
r∏
i=1
dimA(i), (23)
R(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR) :=
logm
logD(Ψ
(m,r)
QPIR)
. (24)
Define two r-round QPIR capacities as follows. For an error
constraint α ∈ [0, 1), server secrecy constraint β ∈ [0,∞],
user secrecy constraint γ ∈ [0,∞], and upload constraint
θ ∈ [0,∞], The asymptotic security-constrained capacity
and the exact security-constrained capacity are defined as
Cα,β,γ,θ,rasymp := sup
{mℓ}
∞
ℓ=1,
{Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR}
∞
ℓ=1
{
lim inf
ℓ→∞
R(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR)
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
ℓ→∞
Perr(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR) ≤ α, lim sup
ℓ→∞
Sserv(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR) ≤ β,
lim sup
ℓ→∞
Suser(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR) ≤ γ, lim sup
ℓ→∞
logU(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR)
logD(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR)
≤ θ
}
,
Cα,β,γ,θ,rexact := sup
{mℓ}
∞
ℓ=1,
{Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR}
∞
ℓ=1
{
lim inf
ℓ→∞
R(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR)
∣∣∣∣ Perr(Ψ(mℓ,r)QPIR) ≤ α, Sserv(Ψ(mℓ,r)QPIR) ≤ β,
Suser(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR) ≤ γ, lim sup
ℓ→∞
logU(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR)
logD(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR)
≤ θ
}
,
where the supremum is taken for sequences {mℓ}∞ℓ=1 such
that limℓ→∞mℓ = ∞ and sequences {Ψ(mℓ,r)QPIR}∞ℓ=1 of QPIR
protocols.
B. Capacity of multi-round QPIR capacity
We propose the capacity theorem for the multi-round QPIR
capacity.
Theorem V.1 (Multi-round QPIR capacity). For any positive
integer r, the r-round QPIR capacity when there are f ≥ 2
files and n ≥ 2 servers sharing preexisting entanglement is
C0,β,γ,θ,rexact = C
0,β,γ,θ,r
asymp = 1 (25)
for any β, γ, θ ∈ [0,∞].
Proof. Eq. (25) is proved by the following inequalities:
1 ≤ C0,0,0,0,rexact ≤ C0,β,γ,θ,rexact ≤ C0,∞,∞,∞,rasymp ≤ 1. (26)
The first inequality follows by applying the rate-one QPIR
protocol in Section III-B repetitively r times. The second and
third inequalities follow from the definition of the capacities.
The last inequality is proved in Section V-C. Therefore, we
obtain the theorem.
C. Weak converse bound of multi-round QPIR capacity
We prove the converse bound
C0,∞,∞,∞,rasymp ≤ 1. (27)
First, we prepare the following proposition from [29, The-
orem 4].
Proposition V.1. [29, Theorem 4] Consider the communi-
cation of classical message W ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1} by sending
quantum systems A(1), . . . ,A(r) sequentially and assisted by
classical feedback, where the sender and receiver have inde-
pendent quantum memories. We have the following inequality
(1− ε) logm ≤
r∑
i=1
H(ρ
(i)
A(i)
) + h2(ε) (28)
≤
r∑
i=1
log dimA(i)+h2(ε), (29)
where h2(·) is the binary entropy function, ρ(i)A(i) is the received
state on A(i), and ε := Pr[W 6= Wˆ ] is defined for the
uniformly chosen message W and decoding output Wˆ .
Remark V.1. The statement of Proposition V.1 is slightly
different from the statement of [29, Theorem 4]. First, whereas
[29, Theorem 4] considers an energy constraint on the quantum
channel, Proposition V.1 assumes that there is no energy con-
straint. Second, whereas [29, Theorem 4] is for the repetitive
uses of a fixed quantum channel N , Proposition V.1 considers
each use of the identity quantum channels overA(1), . . . ,A(r).
As a result, we obtain the inequality (28) from the first
inequality of [29, Eq. (35)].
For a sequence {Ψ(mℓ,r)QPIR}∞ℓ=1 of r-round QPIR protocols,
define εℓ := Perr(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR). Since we can consider the r-round
QPIR protocol Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR as communication of classical message
WK from the collection of all servers to the user by sending
quantum systems A(1), . . . ,A(r) sequentially and assisted by
classical feedback Q(1), . . . , Q(r), Proposition V.1 implies
(1− εℓ) logmℓ ≤
r∑
i=1
log dimA(i)+h2(εℓ). (30)
Therefore, if limℓ→∞ εℓ = 0, we have
lim
ℓ→∞
R(Ψ
(mℓ,r)
QPIR) = lim
ℓ→∞
logmℓ∑r
i=1 log dimA(i)
≤ 1, (31)
which implies (27).
8VI. CONCLUSION
We have studied the capacity of QPIR with multiple servers
sharing preexisting entanglement. Considering not only the
user secrecy but also the server secrecy, we defined two kinds
of QPIR capacity, asymptotic and exact security-constrained
capacities with upload constraint, and proved that both QPIR
capacities are 1 for any security constraints and any upload
constraint. We constructed a capacity-achieving rate-one pro-
tocol by using two servers where the file size is the square of
an arbitrary integer. The converse is proved by focusing on the
downloading step of QPIR protocols. Furthermore, we proved
that the capacity of multi-round QPIR is also 1 with the weak
converse bound.
There are several remaining problems of QPIR. Since we
treated the QPIR under assumption of previously shared en-
tanglement, it is interesting open question whether the QPIR
without shared entanglement also has advantage over the
CPIR counterparts. Moreover, to guarantee the higher level
of security on QPIR protocols, QPIR should also be studied
for the case that some of the servers collect their queries to
obtain the user’s query index.
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APPENDIX A
PRELIMINARIES ON QUANTUM INFORMATION THEORY
In this section, we briefly introduce the fundamental frame-
work of quantum information theory. For more detail, see [28],
[30], [31].
In classical information theory, the information is defined by
an element x of a finite set X , and the information x is changed
by a function f : X → Y , where Y is a finite set. Similarly,
in quantum information theory, the quantum information is
defined by a quantum state ρ on a quantum system A, and the
quantum states ρ on A is modified by quantum operations
κ from the states on A to the states on B, where A and
B are quantum systems. Another difference between the two
information theories is the measurement of information. If
there is no error on the measuring apparatus, the measurement
of classical information x is deterministic and does not change
the information, i.e., measurement outcome is x and the
information x is not changed after the measurement. However,
the measurement of a quantum state outputs its outcome
probabilistically and changes the state. In the following, we
define the quantum system, quantum state, quantum operation,
and quantum measurement.
A quantum system is defined by a finite-dimensional Hilbert
space A. A vector x in A is denoted by |x〉, and x¯⊤ is denoted
by 〈x|. A quantum state is defined by a positive semidefinite
matrix ρ on A such that Tr ρ = 1, called a density matrix.
We denote the set of density matrices on A by S(A). When a
state ρ is rank-one, i.e., ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, the state is called a pure
state and is identified with the unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ A. If a state
ρ is not a pure state, it is called a mixed state. The composite
system of A and B is defined by A ⊗ B. For any quantum
state ρ ∈ S(A ⊗ B), the reduced state on A is described by
TrB ρ, where TrB is the partial trace on the system B. A state
ρ ∈ S(A ⊗ B) is called a separable state if ρ can be written
as ρ =
∑
i piσi ⊗ τi for states σi ∈ S(A), τi ∈ S(B), and a
probability distribution {pi}i. A state ρ ∈ S(A⊗B) is called
an entangled state if ρ is not separable.
A quantum operation is defined by a Trace-Preserving
Completely-Positive (TP-CP) linear map from S(A) into
S(B). A linear map κ is called a positive map if κ maps a
positive semidefinite matrix to a positive semidefinite matrix,
and is called a Completely-Positive (CP) map if the linear map
κ ⊗ ιCn is a positive map for any positive integer n, where
ιCn is the identity map on S(Cn). An example of quantum
operations is κU(ρ) := UρU† for a unitary matrix U on A. By
the operation κU, a pure state |ψ〉 ∈ A is mapped to the pure
state U|ψ〉 ∈ A.
A quantum measurement is defined by an instrument. A
set {κω}ω∈Ω of CP maps from S(A) to S(B) is called an
instrument if for any quantum state ρ ∈ S(A),∑
ω∈Ω
Tr κω(ρ) = 1.
With probability Trκω(ρ), the measurement outcome is ω and
the state after the measurement is κω(ρ)/Trκω(ρ). When one
is interested only in the measurement probability and outcome,
the measurement is described by a Positive Operator-Valued
Measure (POVM). A set {Mω}ω∈Ω of positive semidefinite
matrices is called an POVM if
∑
ω∈ΩMω = I . With proba-
bility Tr ρMω, the measurement outcome is ω.
APPENDIX B
QUANTUM INFORMATION MEASURES
In this section, we introduce quantum information measures
necessary for the analysis of QPIR protocols.
By diagonalization, any quantum state ρ can be written as
ρ =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i| for
∑
i pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0 (∀i). For a state
ρ =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i|, von Neumann entropy is defined by
H(ρ) := H({pi}), (32)
where H(·) in the right-hand side of (32) is Shannon entropy
H({pi}) := −
∑
i pi log pi. For any state ρ ∈ S(A ⊗ B), we
use the notation
H(A)ρ := H(TrB ρ), H(B)ρ := H(TrA ρ),
H(A,B)ρ := H(ρ).
For any state ρ ∈ S(A⊗B⊗C), the quantum conditional en-
tropy, quantum mutual information, and quantum conditional
mutual information are defined as
H(A|B)ρ := H(A,B)ρ −H(B)ρ, (33)
I(A;B)ρ := H(A)ρ +H(B)ρ −H(A,B)ρ, (34)
I(A;B|C)ρ := I(A;B, C)ρ − I(A; C)ρ. (35)
9When a quantum state ρX ∈ S(A) is prepared depending
on the random variable X ∈ X , the state on the composite
system of A and X is defined by
ρ˜ =
∑
x∈X
Pr[X = x] · ρx ⊗ |x〉〈x|.
For convenience, we denote H(·)ρX := H(·)ρ˜ and I(·)ρX :=
I(·)ρ˜.
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